This simple classroom experiment demonstrates many of the behavioral phenomena associated with the voluntary provision of a public good. The mechanics of the game are explained in detail and complete instructions are provided, as well as suggestions for follow-up lectures. Influences such as anonymous voting, persuasion, returns to free-riding, and duration of association can be explored in connection with concepts of incentives, individual rationality and group welfare. A number of variations and extensions can be used to incorporate prisoners' dilemmas, incentive compatible mechanisms, negative externalities, and Coasian bargaining.
"But since every individual believes that he would benefit from the services provided regardless of whether he contributed to the service, he has no incentive to pay for the services voluntarily. That is why individuals must be forced to support these goods through taxation," (p. 120) Such statements are paradoxical because although individuals are supposed to have no incentive to contribute we do in fact observe many highly successful examples of voluntary contributions to public goods, Such statements are pedantic, or at least overly general, in that while taxation is usually the recommended solution, many organizations do not have such authority, and there are other mechanisms that can be used to elicit contributions without coercion.
In introducing the subject to students we may argue that universal free-riding can be predicted from our simple theory of self-interested, "rational" choice--a theory that served us well when we lectured on markets for excludable, private goods, But now we encounter a class of goods for which self-interest is both rational and self-defeating at the same time! From the perspective of the experimental economist or game theorist these issues are simply different facets of the principle that "institutions matter''--it is not so much a case of Still, simplistic and inaccurate representations abound. In their review of the instructional literature on free-riding, Asch and Gigliotti comment that the remarkably uniform treatment of free-riding in economics textbooks "misses the opportunity to show students how economic analysis may come to grips with a set of apparently inconvenient facts and with the not uncommon opinion that economists are ethical nihilists, if not worse," (p, 34) Indeed this not uncommon opinion has led to recurrent accusations that we indoctrinate our students to be selfish. These charges range from provocative titles like "Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?" and "Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?" in professional journals (Frank et al.; Marwell and Ames) to recent disparaging remarks in the popular press such as "Economists are not merely dismal, it appears, but selfish and uncooperative, as well" (Anon., p. 71), Rather than defend or perpetuate these stereotypes and prejudices, we can transform these incongruities into a "teachable moment" through a simple classroom experiment that is easy to conduct, fim to play, and rich in empirical content. Just as laboratory exercises are an integral part of the curricula of most scientific disciplines, agricultural economics can also benefit from the selective use of laboratory exercises in experimental economics, In this paper we describe in detail a prototypical oneclass-period experiment and then discuss modifications and variations of the procedure suitable for an extended set of follow-up lectures on public goods,
Background and Rationale for the Instructor
The conditions of the classroom laboratory are not intended to mimic the real world. Quite the opposite, the laborato~environment is specially designed to give the experimenter control over as many variables as possible, In this experiment the instructor has control over several key factors that are now widely accepted to affect the extent of freeriding, but that are not articulated in the simple theory of rational choice. The public good is "pure" in that it is nonrival in consumption and nonexclusionary in its benefits. Moreover, every individual shares equally in the pecuniary benefits. The instructor is in the singular position of controlling each student's marginal valuation of the good, as well as the group optimum, The instructor can also vary the group size, period of association, incentive structure, and conditions of anonymity and communication.
This experiment illustrates a behavioral response (free-riding) that reduces the efficiency of an allocation mechanism (private funding of a public good) even though that mechanism has the potential to make all the participants better off and none worse off. It demonstrates a case where the "invisible hand" of rational, utility maximizing selfinterest can fail to serve the interests of society. Furthermore, students often do not fully appreciate the difficulties in organizing for collective action, This classroom experiment is an entertaining way to reveal some of these complexities of human behavior,
The Mechanics of the Game
A significant advantage of this experiment is that it can be conducted in one class period and students will gain an immediate appreciation of the dynamics of collective action.
However, the instructor may need additional time to record earnings and provide summary statistics.
It is important for students to understand the nature of the payoff table early if they are to make deliberate decisions rather than random choices, and this may take a few rounds of practice. However, assuming the instructions are clear, it should not be necessa~to explain any theory to the students in order for them to start making choices in the game, Before conducting the experiment, we also try to avoid describing the fhnding objective with specific examples like lighthouses or national defense so as not to bias the marginal valuation (the instructions just call it a "Public Good").
To set up this experiment the instructor gives each student an endowment--$0.50 or its equivalent in bonus points--at the beginning of each round. Each student must then decide whether to give the endowment to fund a public good, or keep the endowment, They communicate this decision by writing their name and their vote (to "give" or "keep") on a slip of paper and handing it to the instructor. The instructor counts the number of "give" slips and announces this number to the class, Students then look uptheir individual earnings for that round from the table in their instructions, In our example, if five people (or more) give, then everyone makes as much as (or more than) their original $0.50 endowment. The more people who give, the more everyone makes, But a Keeper always makes $0.50 more than a Giver.
In contrast to the stylized facts of rational choice, but just like the real world, the most frequently observed outcome of this experiment is that some proportion of the class gives in each round and another keeps. Complete cooperation is exceptional, but wholesale free-riding is extraordinary. As students anticipate the end of the experiment (which is usually the end of the class period) there are often dramatically fewer Givers and more "Keepers. If allowed, some interesting attempts by spokespersons to stimulate cooperation may develop in intermediate rounds but, with no mechanism to monitor vohng and penalize defectors, full cooperation tends to be short-hved.
Although "dollars and cents" are used in discussing the instructions and payoffs, bonus or participation points toward the course grade can also be used effectively to motivate students to play the game in earnest. For example, we might offer one point added to the midterm grade for every $10 earned in the experiment, Obviously, the results of public goods experiments are sensitive to the returns to free-riding. If there is no payoff to free-riding then we should expect to see higher levels of cooperation.
This is an importmt real-world variable that may be discussed in a subsequent class concerning the conditions under which one would find cooperation more or less effechve, Table 1 in the Instructions for the Student (Appendix) would need to be extended for classes larger than 25, but the general rule M simple: multiply the number of "gives" by a constant to get the "gives" payoff (we used a constant of 0,10 in the table); add the endowment to this to get the "keeps" payoff, Small classes (n<5) would need a payoff table where n givers would earn at least as much as theu endowment. Very large classes could be divided into teams, This introduces the element of group dynamics in declslon-making, an element not found in the classical model of individual choice, but one that corresponds to many real-world institutions.
As demonstrated in the "Sample Results" section, the instructor may allow talking among class members as an effort to persuade more members to be Givers, but anonymity in actual voting should be preserved. Since many people perceive the experiment as dealing with scnsltive moral issues such as fairness, cooperation, fidelity and solidarity, wc strive to keep the balloting process confidential.
The results of these experiments are quite sensitwe to whether participants feel that strict anonymity can and will be maintained. In the terminology of game theory, the potential for "monitoring" is a significant variable in determining the extent of free-riding, In many economics experiments talking among subjects is prohibited in order to inhibit strategic signaling and collusion, Relaxation of this convention is relatively harmless m this experiment and may be used to illustrate the role of "social entrepreneurs" (McCaleb and Wagner) m devising tactics to facilitate cooperation, The instructor may wish to discourage talking in early rounds and then allow it in later rounds, The number of Givers usually increases with appeals from self-appointed advocates of cooperation whose exhortations can be quite engaging. Such rules of communication are yet another variable in determining the effectiveness of cooperative action, A sustained high level of contributions to the public good 1s unlikely when using the payoff Vdble provided here. This is predictable mainly because of the substantial returns to free-riding that are built into the table. Another destabilizing element is introduced when students know the game is going to end with the class period; they tend to display more self-interest in later rounds. Figure 1 shows the results of an experiment in a class of 16 students. The experiment was conducted before the topics of public goods and free-riding were introduced in lecture. The session occupied an entire 50-minute class period. Talking was not allowed in the first four rounds, but by the J Agr, and App[led Econ, December, 1994 fourth round some students were exhibiting considerable frustration at not being able to communicate with other students (presumably to explain the payoff table and bring attention to the benefits of cooperation). At this point the instructor offered to relax the rules and allow the students to talk things over.
Sample Results
The next round showed a substantial increase in contributions, but this eroded in Round 6. The students conversed again and in Round 7 they achieved 100 percent of the maximum contribution rate. By this time the end of the class period was imminent and further attempts to sustain the coalition were progressively less successful until the last round was announced and the game ended with only two Givers. About one "dollar" per person per round was earned on the average over the ten rounds, at a dollar-to-bonus point conversion rate of 10:1, A small fraction of students were freeriders in every round (except the seventh). A few consistently contributed throughout the experiment. Most alternated between "giving" and "keeping." Ironically, a sentiment commonly expressed by this group was "I tried to be cooperative but found it didn't pay because others were too greedy!" 584 Nelson and Bei[, Jr: When Se~-In!eres( is SeljDefeating, The Pubkc Goods Experiment us a Teaching Tool 
Round Number

Debriefing: What the Experiment Demonstrates
After several rounds of play, students have accumulated tangible experience in the dynamics of free-riding behavior.
The economic principles underlying this phenomenon can be the topic of subsequent lectures. Our exposition is something like the following.
Free-riding can lead to a condition that is sometimes described as "market failure" whereby the private market fails to efficiently supply a good or service for which there is ample, though perhaps latent, demand. Because free-riders do not reveal their true demand for public goods, it is often argued that public financing is the only way to provide such goods, with the allocation mechanisms of choice being majority rule and fixed tax shares. Nevertheless, in the real world we often see examples of private financing by voluntary contributions that result in the provision of public goods such as college athletics programs, churches, art exhibits, and public broadcasting, An important distinction is that in the real world we do not know each person's marginal valuation of the public good. In the case where some people perceive their marginal benefit to be less than the marginal cost imposed, public financing by taxation results in the antithesis of free-riding, a phenomenon wryly described by Gordon Tullock as "coerced carrying" (McCaleb and Wagner).
A real-world agricultural example relates to generic advertising of a commodity like beef, butter, or broccoli. By definition, any increase in the demand for a generic product benefits all producers of that product. The benefits of advertising cannot be captured privately the way they can if the product has a private label, brdnd, or trademark. Thus, generic advertising is often fhnded by a "check-off" program that automatically charges producers some percentage of their input costs or sales revenues. Some of these programs have a refund provision whereby a producer can ask that the amount charged under the check-off be refunded J Agr. and Apphed Econ, December, 1994 585 in full or in part. Producers that exercise this refund provision could be chamcterized as freeriders, Students often suggest that free-riding could be eliminated if everyone were required to contribute to the Public Good. In fact, most generic promotion programs have responded to perceived free-riding in this very way, terminating their refund provisions when refired levels reached disturbing proportions. For the Honey Board this occurred when refi.mds reached 13 percent; for the National Potato Promotion Board, 18 percent; for the Cotton Board, 35 percent; and for the National Egg Board, 45 percent (Forker and Ward pp. 92 and 108). However, not all organizations are vested with the authority to tax and, for those that are, coerced carrying can be an unwelcome consequence.
Students also complain that their main frustration with the game is that they are not allowed to know how other students had voted, Members of international cartels like OPEC voice a similar complaint when they cannot effectively monitor cartel members' actions and penalize them for departures from the monopoly price. Indeed, the economics of public goods is similar in many ways to that of oligopolies.
A homework question on "What do you think were important factors determining contributions in each round?" can generate some penetrating insight and novel extensions. For example, one student commented that the experiment was "like a prediction game" in that his decisions were based on anticipations of how many others would give--a fair description of the process of rational expectations formation. Another student remarked that persuasive efforts were like advertising, and we noted that they do display some of the same "wearing out" effects in subsequent periods,
Responses to the question "What Improvements can you suggest to increase voluntary contributions?" produced such refinements as "ask for a show of hands of intentions to give before each round" and "put the givers' slips into a lottery pool, draw names at random, and give a bonus to the winners, "
While we have used the Public Goods game primarily in lower-division undergraduate classes in marketing and macroeconomics (with both majors and non-majors) it can be adapted to intermediate, advanced and graduate classes, Such extended expositions could use game theory to formalize the notion of free-riding as a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto-dominated by the nonequilibrium outcome (full contributions), Students could be challenged to design an allocation mechanism that is non-dictatorial, Pareto-optimal, and strategy-proof (Ledyard) . Majority rule satisfies these conditions, but only if there are no more than two possible allocations, For three or more allocations an impossibility theorem has established the nonexistence of such an optimal mechanism (Satterthwaite). Although no dominant alternative institution has been developed, numerous rules for making committee decisions have evolved, and some unconventional mechanisms have been proposed such as the Wicksell-Lindahl tax scheme, Thompson's D-Process, and the Groves-Ledyard mechanism (Feldman) .
Variations and Extensions of the Game
The research literature of experimental economics conlams many extensions and elabortions on the theme of public goods provision, Most of these investigations are beyond the scope of the basic principles under discussion here, or are oriented toward research rather than teaching applications, However, there are several variations that may prove instructive in the undergraduate or graduate classroom setting.
Random Endpoint
One simple variation is to make the duration of the game more uncertain, The propensity for cooperation to deteriorate is not as predictable if players do not know when the game will end, especially if it is perceived to continue well beyond one class per]od in the future. A game with a random endpoint can be used to examine th]s effect on the sustainability of cooperation. The random endpoint can be determined by rolling a pair of dice or picking a card from a shuffled deck. When a certain number or card appears, the game ends,
Although not common in real-world applications, endpoint anticipation has been noted as an Important treatment variable influencing the (Andreoni) .
Vanah[e Cono-ibullons
Another insuwmonal mochiicamm allows the student to rmkc varlablc comnmmons to the pubhc good instead of' the aU-or-rlothlng cholcc descrtiied above. Whale this varwtuon IS more reprcsemauvc of real-world sltuauons, It reduces Ihe number of" rounds that cm De played in a class pcrlod because mslcad 01" just courumg "gives" the instructor now has to sum the dil fcrem comnbutl ons on all the slips of paper beiore the value of the pubhc good can be announced. Typically the instructor adds some percentage LOthe sum ot the comt"ibutlons to deterrnrnc the value of' the publlc good.
This varlanon has been adapted for classroom usc by Brock [or repeated play among teams of students, and by Sutock for a one-shot game whe~c students contribute their own money. Brock suggests a homework exercmc to derive the market demand cum'e for the pubhc good by vertically summmg the willingness to pay of' the individual teams.
Pmotler's I)ilerrwtra
13rock also describes a game-tneoretic mtcrprctauon of' the public goods game that N constructed as a Prlsoncr's IMernrna, Since our vcrwon uses all-ol-ntrthmg contr-lbutlons it fits this irueqmetatlon beucr than the variable conmbuuons version, For a game with 20 players, the Prwtmcr's IMemma payoff rrmtrlx that corresponds to table 1 1s shown in figure 2. The larger type tmhcates "your payofl:" whale the smaller type mchcatcs "every othcrplayer's payoff" assummg they all do tile same thing.
The game-theoreuc Cxposltlon 1s parmxtlarly well-stuted to dlustmte why tree-riding IS a Nash equihbrmm even though IuILcooperation is Pareto-dommant.
f+'ovlslon POI}12LS
[swat, Schmidt~, and Walker describe a modificauon In which cormibuuons to the pub~ic good can be increased substantially. In this design the pubhc good is provided only if total contrlbuuons reach some pre-specdied threshold called a "provmon point"; otherwise cormbuhons arc rerurncd under a money-back guarantee. In the all-or-r~oth]rlg case, the provlslon point can be consuucced to render a Nash equlhbnurn where fidl contrmtmon now Pareto-dornmates the free-rider equdlbnum.
Again using an example with 20 players and table 1, the payoff matrix corresponding to a full-conmbtmon provlslon point of 20 with a mcmcy-track gwaramce is shown in [igurc 3.
Any prowslon point less than the fuli conmbunons case illusuatcd m figure 3 [cads to a dlf ferem set O(~nccnuves to free-rldc. For wmmplc, with 20 players and a prowwon point of 19, figure  4 shows that "kcepmg" is the best strategy (i[ everyone else can be counted on to "give"). Figure 5 illustrates the results from a class of 44 students where the first six rounds followed the rules described above for the prototype gdrne and the last SIXrounds used various prowsion points with the money-back guarantee. The prowsion pom~s used in this game were suggested by class mcrrlbers. Round 7 had a prowslon point set at 30 and met this condmon with 35 gwcrs. Rounds 8, 9, and 10 fell short of their prowsion points and the refund opuon was excrcmd: round 8 required 35 givers but got only 28; round 9 reqtured 35 gm'ers but got only 25; round 10 required 43 givers but got only 41. Rounds 11 and 12 attained thclr prowslon pomls, which were both set at full contrlbuhons (44). Students apparently carnc to realize that any plovlslorl point less than full contributions t>mesthe same free-rider problems as the basic game.
Elagnolland McKee relate several instances where Lhe prowslon point mcchamsm wds used to obLam voluntmy conmbuuons to fund a public good. in 19'/9 a succcssfiul effort was rnddc to hlrc a Iobbylst to represent Ihculty welfare before the Oregon stale legislature. All Faculty m the state were asked to contnbutc to the lobbyist's annual sttlary, with the provuio that comribuhons would be rctumcd d'the funding Objective ($30,000) was not (Bagnoli and McKee, p. 351) , Applying the provision point mechanism to generic advertising of agricultural commodities could mitigate the negative effects of coerced carrying and reduce dependence on dictatorial processes such as those endorsed by Forker and Ward: "The free-rider issue will always exist in some form, but the negative effects can be mitigated through nonrefundable mandatory assessments on all of the volume going into the rndrket area in which the demand-expansion program is to be conducted." (p, 258)
Negative Externalities
In addition to these variations on the voluntary contributions game there are several parallels and extensions that may find a place in the classroom exposition.
So far the experiments described have focused on free-riding as a consequence of the non-exclusionary property in public goods. The non-rival property implicit in these games has generated only positive cxterndities. But when anyone can use the good and it can be depleted, as with an open-access resource like public grazing land, negative externalizes can lead to the "tragedy of' the commons".
Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom investigated these effects with experiments using a "commonpool-resource mechanism". Subjects could invest thcw token endowment in either of two markets. One market offered a modest but constant return. The other market appeared to offer a higher return except that as more people invested in it the return steadily decreased. Resource overuse caused rents in the second market to accrue at levels averaging only 5.7 percent of the optimum, a level of rent dwsipation even lower than predicted by standard models of noncooperative behavior.
Market Pdilure problems arising from negative externalities can sometlmcs be resolved if property rights are assigned and side payments are allowed.
Leuthold has adapted a Coasian bargaining experiment for the classroom. Students are paired and one is chosen as the "controller" who determines the number of units to be produced (say, units of water pollution abatement), The second player earns progressively higher returns for more units (because cleaner water is more valuable to him), while the controller earns progressively less (because he has to pay for cleaning the water), The payoff table is constructed so that both will benefit if the controller produces some units in exchange for part of the second player's earnings, The two players bargain over the number of units to be produced and the amount of the side payment. Leuthold reported that students bargained to the optimal number of units an average of 83 percent of the time.
Conclusions
Experiments are not just for researchers anymore. They can be an effective tool in teaching agricultural economics and are especially well-suited to involving students in the process of discovery. Moreover, student evaluations of the game consistently range from favorable to enthusiastic, The attractive features of the prototype experiment described here are that it is easy to set up and quick to execute, and it demonstrates economic behavior in a novel way not duplicated by the classroom lecture or textbook reading. It provides students with an empirical foundation--a touchstone--that they can use to understand and appreciate more elaborate concepts of cooperative institutions, resource economics and public finance.
